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Bangladesh is currently in the midst of a deadly 
political crisis. When Bangladesh was born forty-plus 
years ago, it was generally thought that the Achilles 
heel of this newly minted country will be its economy. 
History has, however, proved it wrong.  Though the 
proximate cause of this current political crisis is the 
controversial parliamentary election of 2014 and the 
legitimacy of the incumbent government, its history 
dates back to the birth of the country. Designing  a 
neutral institutional mechanism for holding elections, 
ensuring smooth transfer of power and establishing 
intra-party democracy—these are  the obvious first 
steps for a procedural democracy . They will 
extinguish the immediate fire, but do not address the 
root cause of the recurrent democratic crises in the 
country. 
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   Bangladesh’s Democratic Challenge  
 
Bangladesh is currently in the midst of a deadly political crisis.  Since the onset of the crisis in 
January, the economy has been    in dire straits.  According to newspaper reports, more than 
hundred lives (and still counting) have been lost; thousands have been wounded; and schools 
and colleges have remained virtually closed. The tempo of business activities, including 
agricultural production, has been       severely disrupted; new investments, both foreign and 
local, have mostly evaporated; exports of manpower and garments, the lifeline of the 
Bangladesh economy, have suffered serious blows; and millions of dollars’ worth of properties 
have been damaged and destroyed.  
If one follows the old UNDP rule-of-thumb that   political blockade costs the country 0.3 percent 
of GDP per day, then the country may have already lost more than 15 percent of its annual 
income, around 30  billion dollars, a staggering  sum that is   equivalent to  15 years’  of foreign 
aid.   
 When Bangladesh was born forty-plus years ago, it was generally thought that the Achilles heel 
of this newly minted country will be its economy. History has, however, proved it wrong.  After 
a difficult start, the nation has done well at economic development. The economy has grown at 
about six percent over the last two decades; its social indicators have improved significantly—
even exceeding those of its neighbor, India, on many important counts. With some social 
stability, Bangladesh is on its way to join the ranks of middle- income countries.  
 
This economic success notwithstanding, politics—in particular, getting the seeds of democracy 
to sprout— has proved daunting. In a careful comparative analysis of the quality of democracy 
in India and Bangladesh, Indiana University democracy- expert Sumit Ganguly ( 2005)  
concludes: while the quality of democracy has improved in India over the years, it has 
“regressed” in Bangladesh.   
That is odd because:  it is a country that emerged out of a bloody political struggle to establish 
democratic rights of the people; it prides itself on its ethnic and linguistic homogeneity; political 
progress generally accompanies economic success.  
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Though the proximate cause of this current political crisis is the controversial parliamentary 
election of 2014 and the legitimacy of the incumbent government, its history dates back to the 
birth of the country. The original sin of Bangladesh democracy, some experts suggest, has been 
its hurriedly drafted constitution in 1972 that assigned extravagant powers to the office of 
prime minister, a position to be assumed by its much-revered father of the nation.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the country went through a tumultuous period of experimentation 
with the   presidential form of government, which was often been a cover-up for authoritarian 
regimes—both civil and military. In the 1990s, after a popular movement, the parliamentary 
form of government was re-established. And the arc of power shifted from the president to the 
prime minister, who was anointed with what used to be the unbridled power of the autocratic 
president. Those powers were further augmented by successive governments, which  went on  
stifling  various civil, political and human rights—allowing   arbitrary arrests, unlawful 
deprivation of life, regulation of  speech, and weak  working and labor rights. With few checks 
and balances in the government, what emerged was an incredibly shrunken democracy with an 
“imperial” prime minister.    
 
Since 1991, the government has become a duopoly of two major parties—the Awami League 
(AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) — and the position of prime minister of the 
country has rotated between Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Their personal backgrounds and 
the way they inherited the mantle of leadership, some argue, explicates the dynamics of the 
post-1990 politics in Bangladesh:   Their dynastic ascendance to leadership, without any   
political competition, sheds light on the   way they run their respective parties— as family 
business;  similarly, their personal backgrounds—once housewives, later  accidental leaders—
explain  why debates between parties devolve into issues of political legacies than bear on 
important economic and social questions of the time.  
 
There has been a coarsening of the political culture over the years. The debasement  of political 
discourse   has been   so deep and wide   that even major political figures   now routinely speak 
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of “termination” and “annihilation” of opponents— or,   trash talk about foreign diplomats   
they  disfavor .  In such an environment, it is no brainer why politics has attracted—except for 
some hardened risk-takers—few among the best and the brightest of recent generations.   
On the other hand, this stultifying political culture, in conjunction with the lack of governmental 
accountability, has yielded a bountiful   harvest of political cronies, on both sides, who thrive on 
economic rents extracted through  discriminatory access of state resources-- or even flat-out 
thievery of state belongings.  
 
Not surprisingly, when in power, both parties have proved inept at governance and corrupt in 
administration. Under both parties, Bangladesh ranked near the top in the league of corrupt 
nations. In 2012, the international   donors under the leadership of the World Bank cancelled a 
mega-loan to Bangladesh to build its longest bridge, citing concerns over corruption in the 
project.   
 
When in power, both parties did their best to manipulate elections and exclude the other from 
power. To avert this, since 1996, Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections had been conducted by 
an interim neutral administration, which brought   an element of accountability in a system of 
otherwise “appalling quality”, suggests Professor Ganguly. However, this system was abolished 
with an amendment to the constitution in June 2011.  
 
In the absence of a neutral caretaker administration, the opposition BNP and it allied parties 
apprehended widespread rigging and decided not to   participate in the 2014 parliamentary 
elections. In a country so besotted with polls and politics, perhaps more than anywhere  in the 
world, the elections had little voter participation—and out of 300 seats,  154 were 
unchallenged.    
 
The leader of the opposition Khaleda Zia has vowed   that her party and its allies will continue 
the ongoing blockade until the government agrees to hold a free and fair early election.  
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Even if the government succeeds in crushing this current political turmoil, this does not spell 
the end of the crisis. The crisis will fester as the opposition commands as at least as much 
political support from the people as the government.  (Neither party has commanded a 
majority of votes when both contested.) If, however, the government acquiesces to the 
demands of the opposition, it will bring only a temporary relief to the current crisis, as they do 
not address the country’s fundamental democratic deficits that metastasized over the years.  
 
Designing  a neutral institutional mechanism for holding elections, ensuring smooth transfer of 
power and establishing intra-party democracy—these are  the obvious first steps for a 
procedural democracy . They will extinguish the immediate fire, but do not address the root 
cause of the recurrent democratic crises in the country: the absence of an infrastructure   of a 
viable liberal democracy.  
 
A liberal democracy needs to be built on the foundation of a capable state, rule of law and 
government accountability, writes Stanford Political Scientist Francis Fukuyama (2014), a world-
class expert on problems of weak and failed states, in his magisterial works on democracy.    In 
Bangladesh, to build such an institutional infrastructure, there must be reforms to ensure the 
true independence of the judiciary, to nurture a non-politicized merit-based bureaucracy and to 
roll-back the much- abused emergency powers of the executive.  Constitutional bodies like the 
Election Commission and the Anticorruption Commission need to be independent, rather than 
being the handmaiden of the party in power. As   independent international watch-dog 
organizations have repeatedly of the chilling acts of human rights violations of the security 
forces of the country, they    need to be independently investigated— and then, be either 
dismantled or brought under a strict legal framework.  
 
All this is a tall order even for a competent, well-meaning government.  It requires a 
fundamental ‘reset’ of politics, which is particularly challenging in the current hyper-partisan, 
vile political environment. Therefore, unless there is a groundswell of enlightened leadership on 
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both sides, prospects for reforms in Bangladesh to consolidate and deepen democracy may be 
remote in the near future. 
 
However, failure is no option. Any rational leader should realize that politics is the art of 
compromise, and not of confrontation. An obstinate attempt by one side to prevail over the 
other   by force would be futile, as any such victory would be both pyrrhic and temporary.  On 
the other hand, political compromise would be in the best interest of the nation:  it will spare 
the nation of the periodic bouts of    mayhem that impede the pace of economic and social 
progress.   And this will also set the two leaders free—who themselves are invisible prisoners of 
an illiberal system—to gracefully recede into the golden sunset without being concerned about 
their political legacy or their personal safety.   
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